From the early twentieth century, many Australian farm products have had their prices set by some form of intervention, often administered by a statutory marketing board. Wool was different: intervention, other than war-related exigencies, came much later and in a different mechanism, a reserve price scheme (hereafter RPS). The RPS that operated from 1970 until its collapse in 1991 has been roundly criticised. Four key elements explain the belated emergence and particular form of price controls: the specific characteristics of wool -its importance to the economy, its export orientation, and its non-perishability; the shifting locus of economic and political power in favour of small farmers; the declining influence of the wool-selling brokers and their associations; and the rise of statutory bodies and their capture by key figures supporting increased government participation. 
Introduction
From the early twentieth century, the price of many Australian farm products was set by some form of intervention, usually a statutory marketing board.
2 Volatile commodity prices impacted heavily on the growing class of small farmer who had fewer resources to fall back on than their colonial forebears and who faced unstable cycles of boom, bust and wartime imperatives. Wool was different, however -centralised control came much later and took a 1 We thank Shey Newitt for research assistance and staff at the University of Melbourne Archives for their help. Claire Wright kindly assisted with formatting the paper. Frank Bongiorno and Stuart Macintyre offered helpful feedback on an earlier draft. We are grateful for funding from the Australian Research Council under project DP 1095758. Two anonymous referees are thanked for their helpful comments. 2 S. Harris, "Some measures of levels of protection to Australia's rural industries", Australian Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol8, 2 (1964) Australian and New Zealand Primary Products (London, 1936) ; P. J. Lloyd, and D. MacLaren "Relative assistance to Australian and manufacturing since Federation", Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, 59, 2 (2015), pp. 159-70. distinctive form with the introduction of a partial reserve price scheme in 1967 before one covering the entire clip in 1970. Apart from two episodes of war related intervention, the price of wool before this time reflected the intersection of the demand of the buyers and the supply of wool on offer at public auctions around Australia.
In this paper, we seek to explain why intervention in wool markets in twentieth-century Australia was different in form and timing from other commodity trades. Our analysis brings together some of the distinctive aspects of the economy of Australian wool with the changing face of its politics. Policy choices reflected, in part, wool's special place in the national economy through its role as the leading export, with no significant home market, and in its domination of the international raw apparel wool trade. Its heterogeneity as a product provided support for the persistence of broker-led auction sales and contributed to the political fault-lines that divided the wool industry lobby for decades. Its non-perishability kept alive the idea of a reserve price scheme.
In the following section of this paper we narrate the timeline of attempts to introduce central control of wool trading over half a century. The distinctive properties of wool and their influence on policy outcomes is explained in the subsequent section. The shifting locus of economic and political power in the industry in favour of small farmers at the expense of the more conservative graziers and the declining influence of the wool selling brokers' associations is then analysed. The exploitation of the rise of statutory bodies regulating the industry by several influential supporters of intervention provides the final chapter of the adoption of the RPS.
The long history of attempts to control the market for wool
Wool auctions developed around Australia in the last few decades of the nineteenth century replacing consignment to the London markets. At each of the major export cities -Sydney, Melbourne, Geelong, Adelaide, Brisbane, Perth -local woolbrokers jointly operated an open cry auction to dispose of most of Australia's massive wool crop, a system whose efficiency would be commended by overseas experts. 3 It operated continuously to 1970 except for centrally administered schemes brought about by the exceptional conditions of two world wars and their aftermaths (Table 1) .
Control of a supply of wool was a strategic imperative for the British government to clothe its troops and deny access to its enemies. Australian clips from 1916-1920 and 1939-1946 were acquired by Britain at prices that exceeded those prevailing in previous years. A number of other commodities ̶ wheat, meat, dairy products, sugar, eggs, fruits and metals ̶ were subject to similar arrangements in both wars.
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During the compulsory purchases, auctions were replaced by a system of appraisal whereby wool arriving into store was sorted into over 800 types or 'limitations' of wool whose value was set with reference to achieving an average price of 15.5d per pound for the whole clip.
Better quality wool received higher than average prices while lower quality wool received less. A similar procedure was followed in World War II when the average price was 13.4d
per pound from 1939 to May 1942, then increased to 15.5d per pound. Australia, 1945 (cat. no. 1301 .0, 1945 ), p. 1106 . 6 E. Dyason, "BAWRA", Economic Record, Vol. IV, Supplement (1928 E. McCarthy, Wool Disposals 1945 -52: The Joint Organization (Melbourne, 1967 might be achieved and the type of administrative framework required. 8 The main steps in the process are shown in Table 2. The neatness of the table masks a messier litany of proposals and counter proposals emanating from the conferences of the wool growers associations and in state and federal parliaments, most of which were reported in the columns of the rural and metropolitan press. Discussions about intervention were initiated by the overhang of stocks arising from the Imperial Purchase of wool during World War I and the operations of British Australian Wool
Realisation Association (BAWRA), the body appointed to achieve an orderly disposal of the postwar surplus. Sir John Higgins, who had been chair of the Central Wool Council that administered the compulsory acquisition, was the leading interwar advocate of a mechanism to limit the supply of wool placed on the market.
Having failed in 1920 to persuade the growers and brokers of a plan to agree jointly on the volume of wool offered each season, he offered a more comprehensive and permanent scheme in 1922. Wool not reaching the minimum reserve price would be acquired by the 'central organization', BAWRA, to be re-offered when prices had returned to higher levels.
In the face of fierce opposition from the conservative graziers and the brokers, the motion was defeated by a vote of its shareholders to wind up BAWRA's business.
In the wake of a calamitous fall in wool prices during the depression and the economic distress facing many growers, a committee of inquiry in 1932 recommended the introduction of a minimum price which was to be enforced through the application of a prohibition of the export of any wool sold at below that price. The plan was again rejected but the parameters of the debate had shifted. Wool, though, was distinct from the other commodities in ways which limited the type of assistance that could be applied. It exported most of its output, wool was the nation's leading export over long periods of time, and it dominated the international wool trade. 19 It was not possible for wool producers to increase their total receipts significantly by forcing local woollen mills to pay above the export price for wool. 20 Few avenues were open to the wool industry to 'tax' local consumers. Import duties, therefore, would provide no benefit to the industry. While subsidies were possible, it made more fiscal sense to shift the burden to foreign buyers through an export tax, or, given the relatively low elasticity of demand, some form of price manipulation.
A RPS was more feasible for wool than nearly every other commodity. Its non-perishability enabled it to be stored for long periods as part of the manipulation of supply that the scheme would require. By contrast, the wheat acquired by the British government during World War I had suffered considerable damage and spoilage during storage. 21 Moreover, wool was the only commodity for which there existed a large supply of storage capacity. The selling brokers had capacious warehouses and additional capacity was found by the Central Wool
Committee during World War I as stocks grew. Their administration of the functions previously performed by the brokers ̶ transportation, storage, appraisal of the value of each bale, and payment of the growers − as well as the operations of BAWRA in managing the sale of the stored wool, gave promise that the administrative machinery for a RPS was already in place. 22 Australia's leading role in the international wool trade and the relative inelasticity of supply additionally meant that holding buffer stocks and raising prices above market levels would not merely push market share to other producers.
17 E. Dunsdorfs, The Australian wheat-growing industry, 1788 -1948 (Melbourne, 1956 ), pp. 267-90; Lloyd and MacLaren, "Assistance to Australian agriculture", Table 1 . 18 Harris, " Australia's rural industries"; Lloyd, "Agricultural price policy"; Watson and Parish, "Marketing agricultural products"; G. Whitwell and D. Sydenham, A Shared Harvest: The Australian Wheat Industry, 1939 -1989 (South Melbourne, 1991 While the lens of public interest suggests the likelihood of strong support for wool producers, the private interest was more problematic. Producers co-operate through political markets to extract rents from consumers forced to pay higher prices. Farm price volatility has encouraged governments to exchange 'transfers' for political support despite evidence from economists of the inefficiencies this has created. 31 The private interest theory of regulation suggests that it was rational for the farmers of particular commodities to devote resources to persuading governments to meet their demands as the benefits accrued to them, while the per capita costs of the 'rents' were comparatively low when dissipated across all consumers.
32
Given that the 'consumers' of wool were largely foreign buyers with limited constituency, the political case for intervention becomes more persuasive. Some groups, however, are better placed than others to extract rents. 33 Another important feature of the wool industry -its heterogeneity -detracted from the ability of producers to extract policy rents. producers. Essentially, this was a bifurcation between the large graziers who were among the earliest settlers and the range of smaller scale producers that emerged from these policies.
The highly heterogeneous character of wool required a very different form of marketing system from most other commodities that were sold directly to merchants or processors such as meat or dairy products. Only wool employed selling brokers as intermediaries between the growers and buyers who provided a comprehensive set of marketing services. They received wool into store, weighed and catalogued it, permitted buyers to inspect sample bales prior to auction, and conducted the auctions. Brokers had built up great knowledge of the complex wool trade and had invested in large warehouse facilities.
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Deep divisions existed within the wool growing community about the best form of marketing.
The large scale specialist wool growers, the 'graziers', favoured the auction system operating without government intervention. Smaller scale growers, an increasing proportion of whom also grew wheat and/or raised beef and dairy cattle, called for assistance. assistance. The risk that larger graziers would be able to buy out smaller farmers in difficult times without support also put the two groups at loggerheads over policy. 40 
The shifting politics of the wool industry

The growing influence of small farmers
The economic bifurcation of the industry described above played out in the political context.
Wool growers were further divided in terms of ideology. The graziers' political views had been forged in the late nineteenth century. In the 1890s they formed political associations, such as the overarching Pastoralists' Federal Council, which was renamed the Graziers'
Federal Council in 1919, to defend themselves against demands from shearers, carters and maritime unions for higher pay. An initial objective of the United Graziers' Association of Queensland was the right to 'freedom of contract'. 41 Liberal economic ideology in the labour market was carried over to a 'hands off' attitude in the organization of product marketing. As Australian politics was reshaped by the emergence of the Australian Labor Party in the early twentieth century, the conservative side of politics split into an urban party of capital and, after World War I, a Country Party to represent those in the 'bush'. 42 The graziers were united with the urban elite and its political parties through commercial relationships, social networks, and sectarian ties. 43 Farmers found a political voice through the formation of numerous commodity-based farm associations and the Country Party which quickly enjoyed electoral success in many states as well as federally. 44 The smaller wool growers were to win the battle for political influence. Crisp notes that soon after 1900 '…farmers were soon threatening to be able to out-shout the squatters.' 45 Farmers showed a remarkable propensity to organize to protect and advance their interests.
Associations grouped around commodities popped up like mushrooms within and across states and came to forge national bodies. 46 Regular improvements in infrastructure, primarily transport provision and the growth of mass media, reduced the collective action costs for large numbers of rural farmers. 47 Growers felt that they deserved protection from volatile prices and rapacious middlemen: the solution was cooperative marketing arrangements with the assistance of the state. duties were all designed to break up the big family estates, and were too successful in doing so. Taxation laws in respect of tax on undistributed profits precluded family firms from accumulating reserves to be held against tough times'. 
The declining role of the wool selling brokers' associations
The wool brokers' associations and their member companies, the likes of Dalgety, Goldsbrough Mort, and Australian Mercantile Land and Finance, had the most to lose from the end of the auction system, of which they were the central coordinators, or it becoming an adjunct to an administrative system of determining price. They campaigned vigorously to persuade growers to vote against all the proposals for intervention. The quarrel concerned what would come next -whether prices should be 'managed' or left to the dictates of the market according to the trade's custom and practice. Although proposals to create a RPS in the twenties were defeated, the role of the brokers irrevocably altered as growers increasingly played a direct role in industry policy, no longer mediated through the brokers. Participation in the Australian Wool Council (AWC) from 1920 gave the growers a seat at the table. While its principal objective was to determine allocations for the coming season, the growers used the AWC as a forum to press their claims for better terms and conditions from the brokers for the services provided. They were no longer simply clients but partners. 52 Sydney's Association which sold more wool than any other centre was a constant thorn in its side. University of Melbourne Archives, Accession 106, NCWSBA, Minutes, 19/6/1936, 312-16. Increasingly, the brokers felt that 'in a lot of little ways the Growers were encroaching on our preserves'. 53 The growers broke ranks on a range of issues. For instance, they approached the government to give the necessary authority to both research and promotion through the general Government control'. 58 The shortcomings of the brokers and their associations were further exposed when they attempted their own form of buffer stock control to offset intraseason price falls by limiting offerings and/or cancelling auctions, particularly in 1924-25, 1931-32, 1933-34 and 1937-38 . The mixed results confirmed to growers that the brokers could not deliver a smoothing of the price of wool. They lacked accurate information about the wider aspects of the wool market such as production in other countries, stocks in manufacturing countries, demand from the textile industry, or the supply of substitute fibres Critical to this last phase of the adoption of an RPS for wool was that fact that its supporters, especially the AWMPF, had the inside running as they worked within the generously resourced statutory bodies whose policies they could influence and that provided access to senior politicians and bureaucrats. In keeping with customary practice of the relationships between producers and the Country Party, representatives on these boards were drawn from 'nominees of the relevant commodity organizations' whose resultant close links with politicians and bureaucrats gave them a privileged position in the formation of agricultural policy. 67 As Encel noted, Country Party members or 'farmers' representatives are frequently able to hold ministerial portfolios which enable them to advance the interests of farmers by direct administrative action '. 68 This close nexus between producers, politicians, and public bodies had the effect of bringing into coalition three powerful personalities from across these three sectors who, Charles 
Conclusion
The wool industry has occupied a central place in modern Australian history. It created enormous wealth for large squatters-cum-pastoralists in the nineteenth century. By the twentieth century, profits and changes in property regimes had lured many smaller farmers into the industry and attracted the attention of policy makers and economic thinkers aware of its importance for long term development in Australia. Like all commodities, wool suffered from the instability of fluctuating supply and demand; but the stabilising solution deployed for other farm products -statutory marketing boards -was unsuited to a product of wool's heterogeneity. It had apparently found its own solution late in the nineteenth century -a broker led auction system -but this was failing under the pressure of economic uncertainty and political change.
The result was a broad-ranging fifty-year debate about the future of wool marketing in Australia, which infused its way through the mainstream of economic and political debate by encompassing the views of industry leaders, politicians, public servants, and economists. At length, it produced a unique experiment for Australia -a reserve price scheme. The scheme failed within twenty years. In this paper, we have described the long tortuous pathway to an RPS and analysed why it ultimately produced a scheme that was unsuccessful. Throughout its evolution, the weight of economic thinking was opposed to an RPS. However, this came up against a political environment in mid-century that was increasingly receptive to the idea, particularly through the growing number of small farmers, most vulnerable to market fluctuations, with their emerging industrial representation, the AWMPF, and a political voice that was growing louder, the Country Party. The traditional laisser-faire forces of the industry, graziers and brokers, were sidestepped by increasing support for industry statutory bodies after World War Two. Even then, it took a coalition of powerful personalities across growers, politics and officialdom -Gunn, McEwen and Crawford -united in their belief in an RPS and connected through statutory bodies and the Country Party -to drag the RPS over the line. Lobbying by conservative graziers and selling brokers prevents government action.
